INTRODUCTION

23
Ownership structure is a key characteristic of corporate governance and holds 24 important implications for organizational strategy and productivity (Hill & Snell, 25 1989). State ownership -the degree to which an organization's property interest 26 is vested in the state or a public body representing the state -is still an important behavior. 74 The current work contributes to existing theory and research in a number 75 of ways. First, I bridge micro and macro research on China's economic reform (Naughton, 1996; Ramamurti, 2000) , developing a theory regarding 76 how ownership structure influences employee relational model and reactions to 77 organizational practices. This is key to understanding the micro-foundations of 78 institutional reform. I suggest that ownership structure is not associated with 79 different levels of employee motivation (Burawoy & Lukacs, 1985) , but rather 80 associated with different predictors of employee motivation. Thus, whether these 81 differences are acknowledged and addressed properly during the transition may 82 help explain the mixed results of transition effects in macro research. 83 Second, by exploring how ownership structure serves as a key contextual 84 factor altering the well-known relationship between organizational justice 85 and extra-role behavior, I offer new insights into the boundary conditions 86 of justice effects. Because different ownership structures rely on different 87 approaches to motivate employees, it will shape which mechanism of justice is (Fiss, 2008) , it will influence how employees construe their 110 relationships with their organizations. In addition, ownership structure shapes 111 organizational goals (Fiss, 2008) , which will influence the primary concerns among 112 employees. For instance, a state owner focuses more on organizational solidarity 113 and treats workers as 'master of enterprises' (Chiu, 2006) , whereas private owners 114 may focus more on organizational productivity and treat labor as a means to 115 achieve organizational productivity. Thus, their relative weights in the ownership 116 117 structure of organizations will influence how employees construe their relationships 118 with their organizations -as enterprise master or exchange partners -and 119 whether they are primarily concerned with social identity or exchange outcomes. 120 The relational schemas that employees hold and their primary concerns will 121 direct their attention to different organizational practices (Thornton, (Seo & Creed, 2002) . Therefore, only one or a few relational models 132 are salient in a specific context, and economic development generally moves the 133 relational model from communal sharing to market pricing (Fiske, 1992) . nomic development generally moves the relational schema from communal sharing 135 to market pricing (Fiske, 1992) . Applying this theory to employee-organization 136 relationships in China, I argue that the communal sharing model is dominant in 137 SOEs, and the market pricing model is dominant in privatized companies. The 138 following sections will develop these arguments based on previous research.
139
State Ownership in China
140
State ownership is an important characteristic of China's pre-reform socialist 141 economy. China adopted the Soviet model shortly after its revolution (Jackson, 142 1992) , leading SOEs to play a central role in the composition of its planned 143 economy (Groves, Yongmiao, McMillan, & Naughton, 1994 as maintaining political stability, increasing employment, and providing public 147 facilities (Walder, 1989; Zif, 1981) . In conjunction with these obligations, they 148 have greater access to government loans and purchases and face softer budget 149 constraints (Bai & Wang, 1998; Dong & Putterman, 2003) . The incentive system 150 of SOEs has been historically characterized by high social benefits and low cash 151 wages (Walder, 1983) , both of which are allocated equally within classes of workers 152 (Giacobbe-Miller, Miller, & Zhang, 1997). SOEs also provide employment security 153 and used to grant all employees lifelong employment until retirement (Naughton, 154 1996) . SOE employees have more secure employment than employees of non-state-155 owned organizations (Gong & Chang, 2008) . 156 SOEs' equal treatment of workers in their need satisfaction foster a communal 157 sharing schema (Fiske, 1992) in which those within a group are not differentiated and taken care of by the group. Based on interviews with 30 employees and a 158 survey of 500 employees of two SOEs in northeast China, Liu (2003) found that 159 SOEs emphasize group solidarity and treat employees as families. This family 160 culture is further intensified by the socialist ideology, which regards workers as 161 the 'leading class' and 'master of socialist society' (Wang & Greenwood, 2015) . 162 This ideology cultivated a collective identity of SOE employees as the 'master of 163 enterprises' (zhurenweng) (Chiu, 2006 
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A very important institutional embodiment of that identity is the widespread 176 participation opportunities of SOE employees in the governance of SOEs.
177
SOEs institutionalize widespread employee participation in organizational affairs 178 through daily production meetings, yearly workers' congress, various management 179 committees, and incentive-suggestion systems (Tang, 1993; Walder, 1981) . 180 Although these participation opportunities are limited by central planning and 181 party control over leadership selection (Walder, 1981) China's economy has experienced an unprecedented change as it transitions from 203 a centrally-planned socialist economy to a market-oriented capitalist economy 204 (Guthrie, 1999 (Guthrie, 1999) . These privatized companies constitute an important sector in 220 China's economy (Walder, 2011) . The privatization reform abolished privileges 221 provided by the government, tightened budget constraints, and increased market 222 pressure in privatized companies (Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez, & Hitt, 2000) . As a 223 result, privatized companies place a higher priority on efficiency and productivity 224 as organizational goals than SOEs do (He et al., 2004) . human activities based on prices generated from market competition (Friedland 228 & Alford, 1991 (Gong & Chang, 2008) , and use meritocracy as 232 the basis for promotion (Zhao & Zhou, 2004) . That is, the incentive system of 233 privatized organizations follows the rule of equity (Chen, Meindl, & Hui, 1998) . 234 Although SOEs are also increasingly adopting these labor practices, such as 235 bonus payment and piece-rate wages (Groves et al., 1994; Keister, 2002) , their 236 movement towards a modern human resource management system is constrained 237 by government involvement and union strength (Benson & Zhu, 1999) . According between their output and input (Guthrie, 2002 (Chiu, 2002 ) and foreign-invested enterprises (Wang, 2004 partly justify the existence of organizations within markets by lowering transaction 285 costs and increasing coordination at little tangible cost to the firm (Coase, 1937; 286 Williamson, 1981) . Previous research has found that the ownership structure of As a result, the salience of distributive justice and procedural justice in a specific 320 context depends on the dominant relational model in that context.
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Based on cross-cultural research, I suggest that distributive justice is especially 322 salient under the market pricing model, whereas procedural justice is especially 323 salient under the communal sharing model. When people hold the market pricing 324 model, they are primarily concerned with the ratio of their output to their input, 325 which is exactly the definition of distributive justice (Adams, 1965) . Social exchange 326 theory suggests that individuals strive to maximize the resources they receive in social exchanges, and distributive justice makes sure that individuals' inputs 327 into social exchange are fairly rewarded (Colquitt et al., 2013; Organ, 1990) . 328 Because distributive justice is fair distribution of outcomes, people pay attention 329 to distributive justice when their instrumental concern is highlighted. For instance, 330 distributive justice is especially important for countries high in materialism, such 331 as China and Korea (Kim & Leung, 2007) , or when the productivity goal is high-332 lighted (Chen et al., 1998) . In contrast, when the relational concern is highlighted, 333 people attend to procedural justice to make sense of their relational status. Because 334 procedural justice, such as whether people can participate in the decision making 335 process, carries expressive value of how people are treated in their groups and 336 helps individuals address their relational concern (Tyler, 1989 (Tyler, , 1994 . According In this section, I argue that the effects of organizational justice will depend on the 355 ownership structure of organizations. As stated above, the ownership structure of 356 organizations is associated with the dominant relational models employees hold, 357 and the relational models will direct people's attention to the justice practice that 358 is consistent with the dominant model. Specifically, the communal sharing model 359 in SOEs lead SOE employees to pay attention to procedural justice to address 360 their relational concern, whereas the market pricing model in privatized companies 361 will lead employees to resort to distributive justice to address their instrumental 362 concern. Thus, the ownership structure of organizations will moderate the impact extra-role behaviors -described in the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 369 2003) . This model suggests that organization members have a need to belong to the 370 organization and therefore identify with it (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989) , and 371 procedural justice satisfies that need because it enhances members' sense of pride 372 and respect (Tyler & Blader, 2000 the exchange between organizations and employees, and their exchange follows 389 the rule of reciprocity (Colquitt et al., 2013) . This is consistent with the market 390 pricing model, which matches input to output proportionally (Fiske, 1992 are not suitable to characterize employee-organization relationships in this study. 424 Therefore, I conducted a qualitative study to investigate the different relational 425 models under different ownership structures. This is consistent with the qualitative 426 methodology employed in research of relational models (Fiske, 1991) . In order to 427 understand employees' relational models in organizations with different ownership 428 structures, I selected four firms under the same group company, including one 
Results
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The management practices of the four cases are summarized in Table 1. Because   443 Case 2 and Case 3 were both public firms, and their practices were very similar, 444 I combined them into one category. As shown in Table 1 (Naughton, 2005) . Second, because all these firms used to 546 be SOEs before the reform, the cross-sectional sample can provide a clue about 547 the transition effect. Third, because the state directs and controls the transition 548 process, the mobility and transfer of personnel between organizations is kept at a 549 minimum. Thus, the observed relationships are more likely to be driven by change 550 in ownership structure than personal selection. The questionnaire was translated from English to Chinese by the author 570 and back translated to English by a research assistant, following the procedure 571 suggested by Brislin (1980) . In addition, the wording of the questions was discussed 572 with a local manager to ensure that employees can understand it. Questionnaires 573 enclosed in envelopes were distributed to employees at their workplaces, and they 574 were informed that the survey was only for research purposes and assured of and the total equity was calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. 586 The distribution of state ownership in the sample is presented in Figure 1 . 587 Following the example of previous literature (Colquitt, 2001 ), distributive justice Responses were made with a five-point scale (1-highly disagree, 5-highly agree). 593 One of the most important manifestations of procedural justice is organizational 594 members' participation in organizational decision making (Bies & Shapiro, 1988) , 595 and the function of participation in conveying the relational value of procedural 596 justice has been found to be cross-cultural ( justice -also influences their extra role behavior (Colquitt, 2001) . Therefore, this 619 study controlled for interactional justice, which was measured with a four-item scale 620 used in previous research (Blader & Tyler, 2003a , 2003b 
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Firstly, I tested whether missing data was a serious problem in the sample.
647
Missing value analysis showed that the majority of missing values occurred in procedural justice, and leader treatment ( χ 2 (9) = 2172.27, p < 0.001). These 673 comparisons suggest that distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice measured in this study represent distinctive aspects of organizational justice. 674 I also compared the measurement model with a five-factor model that combined 675 psychological collectivism and interdependent self-construal, and the latter fit the 676 data significantly worse ( χ 2 (5) = 219.49, p < 0.001), indicating that collectivism 677 and interdependent self-construal represent distinctive aspects of cultural values. 678 The means, standard deviations, and correlations among all the variables are 679 presented in Table 2 . 680 Thirdly, I used the software HLM7 to test my hypotheses. Considering the 681 nested nature of my data, I constructed a three-level hierarchical linear model to 682 control for industry and firm effects. The results are presented in Table 3 . In the 683 intercept-only model, both firm effects and industry effects were significant, which 684 indicated the necessity of controlling for these effects. In Model 1, I entered the 685 demographic variables into the model. Both position and tenure had significant 686 and positive effects on extra-role behaviors. To test my hypotheses that state 687 ownership accentuates the effect of procedural justice (H1) and attenuates the effect 688 of distributive justice (H2) on extra role behavior, I centered procedural justice and 689 distributive justice around their group means and centered state-ownership around 690 its grand mean, following the suggestion of previous research (Aguinis, Gottfredson, 691 & Culpepper, 2013).
[2] In Model 2, I entered state ownership, distributive justice, 692 and procedural justice into the model. Consistent with previous research, both 693 distributive justice and procedural justice had significant and positive effects on 694 extra-role behaviors. To test the moderation effect of state ownership, I entered 695 these interaction terms in Model 3. The interaction effects significantly improved 696 model fit (χ 2 (2) = 11.74, p = 0.003) and explained 3% of individual-level variance 697 and 5% of industry-level variance according to the procedure suggested by Hox 698 (2010). According to Cohen's standard, the effect sizes were above the low level 699 (0.02) and under the medium level (0.15). Besides the variances explained which 700 indicate explanatory power, Aguinis et al. (2013) also recommended reporting 701 predictive power as indicated by the coefficients of moderation effect. The 702 interaction effect between state ownership and procedural justice (γ = 0.30) was 703 significant and positive, which supported H1. This effect has achieved the medium 704 standard of effect size (Cohen, 1988) . I did a simple slope analysis at one standard 705 deviation above, at, and below the mean level of state ownership (Preacher, Curran, 706 & Bauer, 2006) and plotted the simple slopes in Figure 2 . Simple slope analysis 707 showed that the effect of procedural justice on extra-role behaviors was positive 708 at high (simple slope = 0.21 s.e. = 0.05, t = 4.19, p < 0.001) and medium levels 709 (simple slope = 0.14, s.e. = 0.04, t = 3.94, p = 0.001) of state ownership, but the 710 effect became non-significant at low level of state ownership (simple slope = 0.07, 711 s.e. = 0.05, t = 1.58, p = 0.115).
712
In Model 3 of Table 3 , the interaction effect between state ownership and 713 distributive justice was significant and negative; supporting H2 that state ownership 714 attenuates the positive effect of distributive justice on extra-role behaviors. The 715 effect size of the coefficient (γ = -0.69) was large according to Cohen's standard 716 s.e. = 0.23, p = 0.12). After controlling for the main effect of interactional justice, 742 the hypothesized moderation effects remained significant.
[ (Doucouliagos, 1995) . 783 This study suggests that these organizations should pay attention to the unique are not specific to China. Given that power distance and collectivism are 838 highly correlated with each other (Hofstede, 2001) , it would be challenging 839 to predict whether justice is more or less important for a particular culture. 840 Fiske (1992) Relational models theory (Fiske, 1992) 
